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Introduction 
The global professional service firm (GPSF) is now a significant agent in national and transnational 
political economies. Yet, in existing literatures on transnational governance the role of these firms is 
somewhat hidden by a tendency to place the professions at centre stage. Thus, whilst the literature 
recognizes how ‘the professions in modern society have assumed leading roles in the creation and 
tending of institution’ (Scott, 2008:219), there has been less systematic attention to the role of 
GPSFs as institutional agents. In part this can be explained by the fact that the sociology of the 
professions traditionally does not recognize the analytically distinct nature or role of professional 
organizations within professionalization and broader institutionalization projects (Faulconbridge and 
Muzio, 2012). Yet, such a state of affairs no longer seems tenable. GPSFs have their own agendas, 
capabilities and patterns of activities that are both related to but also distinct from those of the 
wider professional communities to which they belong. From prominent and politically inscribed 
cases such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Arnold, 2005) and carbon trading 
markets (Knox-Hayes, 2009), to less-well reported and softer systems such as regimes around 
sustainable building design (Bulkeley and Jordan, 2012; Faulconbridge, 2013) and competition 
(antitrust) agreements (Morgan, 2006), GPSFs have been central actors in the production of new 
forms of governance. Such compacts are of course important for those actors directly engaged in the 
issues in question. Perhaps more importantly, though, they also matter because, as Suddaby and 
Viale (2011) argue, through their actions GPSFs have wider spin-off effects on adjacent fields, 
whether that is the development of employment law as a result of trade agreements or property 
financing as a result of sustainable design regimes.  
In this chapter we, thus, seek to highlight the importance of advancing the work that does 
exist on GPSFs in the institutionalization of transnational governance regimes through a more careful 
consideration of the identities, projects and effects of the firms in question. We contend that in their 
attempts to develop new markets, services and more efficient internal organizational models, GPSFs 
exercise far reaching institutional effects as they challenge governance regimes, disrupt/create 
jurisdictions, and transform identities, practices and systems of regulation in the professions 
themselves. They do this, we suggest, through three strategies associated with scope of control, 
defining scales of knowledge resources, and the production of ecologies of linked interests. This 
chapter provides, then, a contribution to on-going attempts to ‘revisit theories of professionalism, 
which did not fully anticipate the shift of professional work to the context of large organizations’ 
(Suddaby et al., 2007: 25). 
 
The GPSF in context 
It is important to begin by clarifying what exactly is meant by GPSF. Such clarification is Important 
because we use the term GPSF to refer to two related but subtly different groups of organizations 
(on this differentiation and the debate it inspires see von Nordenflycht, 2010). On the one hand we 
have the ‘old’ professional service firms, old being used to indicate organizations employing 
professionals from long-ago established and state recognised professions. Key examples are 
accountancy, architecture and law (for analysis of each see respectively Cooper and Robson, 2006; 
Faulconbridge, 2010; Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013). Whilst firms have existed in these professions 
for decades or centuries, they have acquired an increasingly global scale in the latter years of the 
20th century. In all cases these ‘old’ GPSFs exploit the monopolies over markets afforded to them by 
professional closure regimes which restrict the production and deliver of services to registered 
individuals and firms structured in line with clearly defined (usually by national professional 
associations) regulations (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007).   
One the other hand we have the ‘new’ professional service firms. ‘New’ is used to indicate 
the rise of a series of occupations that have sought to mimic and claim the same status as the ‘old’ 
professions whilst developing new organizational forms and practices. Examples include executive 
search, management consultancy and project management (see respectively Faulconbridge et al., 
2008; McKenna, 2006; Hodgson, 2007; Paton et al., 2013). Distinctive about these firms is the 
absence of a clearly defined status for the ‘professionals’ employed (they are not part of a state 
regulated profession), yet a tendency to present services as professional. Such attempts stress 
knowledge richness, ethical practice and fiduciary role mimicking the logics underlying the state 
supported closure projects of the ‘old’ professions (Muzio et al., 2011). 
Whilst there are important differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ professional service 
firms (as summarised by von Nordenflycht, 2010), we badge both as GPSFs as the two do share one 
important commonality: the last years of the twentieth and early years of the twenty-first century 
have seen firms exert significant forms of agency designed to ensure control and influence over key 
issues such as corporate globalization, trade regulation, carbon markets etc. This agency, which we 
examine in more detail in the next section of the chapter, emerges from important changes in the 
strategies of GPSFs over time.  
 
Organizational strategies and the institutional agency of GPSFs 
Figure 1 gives examples of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ GPSFs and their key organizational characteristics. 
GPSFs have not always been so large and influential. In their earliest guise, which for some such as 
accountancy firms dates back to the late nineteenth century, GPSFs simply followed their clients. 
Overseas offices were established in locations where home-country clients had or were considering 
setting up operations (Beaverstock et al., 1999; Cooper and Robson, 2006; Bagchi-Sen and Sen, 
1997; Faulconbridge et al., 2008). Globalization was, then, very much about providing a service to 
existing clients, and thus sometimes involved establishing offices but, in cases where client needs 
were sporadic, could also mean establishing best friend alliances with local companies. 
[Insert Figure 1 somewhere here] 
 
Over time, the strategies of GPSFs have evolved. Initial forays overseas gave organizations a taste for 
new markets and highlighted the potential to acquire new clients. Hence, GPSFs became market 
seekers, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s as neoliberal reforms led to more and more clients 
globalizing their operations. This created an ever greater role for fully owned overseas offices (on 
this development trajectory see Bagchi-Sen and Sen, 1997; Faulconbridge et al., 2008). In terms of 
our discussion here, the initial two stages (client follower and market seeker) are, however, of less 
significance than a third stage, which we call market making. In this stage, which is associated with 
the last years of the twentieth and first decade of the twenty-first century, GPSFs became active 
agents in the institutionalization of new transnational regimes. This involves both the importing of 
already existing products and markets into new geographical contexts as part of efforts to reduce 
the complexities of transnational practice – exemplified by the cases of bankruptcy law (Halliday and 
Carruthers, 2009) and sustainable building assessment tools (Cole and Valdebenito, in press) – and 
the creation of supra-national compacts designed to govern activities outside of the nation-state – 
as exemplified by GATS (Arnold, 2005) and competition agreements (Morgan, 2006). In the market 
making stage, GPSFs rely upon their owned offices to act as staging posts for forms of institutional 
work designed to shape rules, norms and logics in ways that locate GPSFs at the centre of new 
economic, political and social regimes (see Beaverstock et al., 2010; Smets et al., 2012; Suddaby et 
al., 2007). It is to the nature of this institutional work and its impacts we now turn. 
 
GPSFs and their institutional work strategies  
This section examines key trends in relation to how GPSFs exercise institutional agency. This is in line 
with the recent focus in the sociology of the professions (Leicht and Fennell, 2008; Scott, 2008; Viale 
and Suddaby, 2011; Muzio et al, 2013) on the agency of the professionals as ‘the preeminent 
institutional agents of our time’ (Scott, 2008, 219), who as ‘lords of the dance’ choreograph the 
broader transformation of societal and economic systems.  
In this analysis, we adopt the concept of institutional work, introduced by Lawrence et al. 
(2009), to capture the diverse forms of GPSF action that have led to new transnational settlements 
relating to issues as diverse as climate change, international trade and the governance of the global 
economy. By institutions we mean the widely recognised rules, norms and cultural-cognitive 
schemes that govern everyday practice relating to particular issues (on this see Scott, 2008); thus 
institutions are the key structuring device of economies and societies. These institutional regimes 
are increasingly transnational in scale, in contrast to earlier periods in which national scale regimes 
dominated (Djelic and Quack, 2010). The concept of institutional work understands the process of 
institutionalization by which (transnational) rules, norms and cultures come to gain widespread 
recognition and influence to involve three forms of agency: creation, maintenance and/or 
disruption. We suggest disruption and creation are especially relevant to our story of the role of 
GPSFS in the development of transnational governance regimes, with agency being exercised to 
disrupt or create institutions depending on what is needed to protect the interests of the GPSFs in 
question.  
In terms of the actual forms that agency takes, the institutional work literature draws our 
attention to the importance of a diverse array of strategies, from the overt such as lobbying 
(Greenwood et al., 2002) and the deployment of discourses to legitimise and inspire change (Phillips 
and Nelson, 2004), to the more covert, banal and often missed such as the use of human resource 
practices, like recruitment and training, to produce suitable individuals which internalize appropriate 
values and norms (Faulconbridge et al., 2012; Pache and Santos, 2010), and the quiet role modelling 
of new institutional regimes which then organically diffuse and gain widespread influence (Smets et 
al., 2012). We suggest that all of these forms of agency are relevant to GPSFs and their attempts to 
develop transnational governance regimes.  
As an illustrative case study, drawing on series of published studies (Arnold, 2005; Robson et 
al., 2007; Suddaby et al, 2007), we use the example of Big Four accountancy firms. These have been 
selected because they are not only the most sophisticated GPSFs but are, as indicated by Figure 1, 
amongst the largest and most global GPSFs. Furthermore, and crucially for our arguments here, they 
have been particularly significant within processes of institutionalization, interacting with nation 
states and supra-national entities like the EU, WTO and IMF to reframe key institutions in ways that 
support their own professional projects. Crucially these attempts at institutional work have had 
broader repercussions, as they reverberate through the transnational field affecting existing 
institutions such as local regulation and qualification systems, national markets and occupational 
jurisdictions, and established societal and corporate practices. In particular, we focus below on three 
interrelated examples: the role of the Big Four accountancy GPSFs in reframing established auditing 
practices and markets (Robson et al., 2007); their attempts to change accountancy qualification 
regimes to create a new transnational designation for business professionals (Suddaby et al, 2007); 
and their use of WTO procedures to challenge national regulations as part of efforts to develop and 
control a global market for their services (Arnold, 2005).  
 
Three examples of institutionalization by GPSFs 
Our first example of the institutional role played by Big Four accountancy firms refers to an issue 
which is at the heart of the accountancy professionalization project (MacDonald, 1995): the 
redefinition of auditing. Auditing has traditionally represented one of the economic cornerstones of 
the accountancy profession. Furthermore, as a highly visible example of what accountants do, it is 
one of their key sources of (self) identity, as well as one of the most persuasive  justifications for 
their professional status as gatekeepers (Coffee, 2005) of public interest  (the protection of 
investors, creditors and the general public through the certification of corporate accounts). Yet, 
despite its foundational role at the heart of the accountancy project, auditing fees have over the last 
few decades been under growing pressure. This reflects the increasing commodification and 
routinization of this area of practice as well as the reluctance of clients to pay for a regulatory 
service which does not directly add value to their business (Coffee, 2005). In this context, 
accountancy firms have been growing alternative and more profitable lines of business such as tax 
advisory and management consultancy services, with auditing divisions decreasing in economic and 
political significance within the firms which they historically dominated. Indeed, reflecting this 
development, during the 1990s the main strategy of the Big Four centred around the treatment of 
auditing as a loss leader to secure clients for more lucrative consultancy services, with auditing 
partners being rewarded for their ability to cross-sell the firms’ broader expertise to their clients 
(Coffee, 2005; Robson et al., 2007).  
Consequently, firms embarked on a project to redefine and reframe auditing practices 
through the development of Business Risk Audit (BRA) methodologies (Robson et al., 2007). BRA 
expands the remit of the traditional audit to include a comprehensive focus on risk management and 
business assurance. In particular, audits are broadened to include the analysis of corporate 
strategies and business processes and the way these generate business risks which in turn affect 
financial statements. This repositioning of the audit was theorized by firms as important for clients 
not only because as a more holistic perspective it was more likely to increase the accuracy and 
reliability of audits, but also because by enlarging its remit BRA methodologies redefine auditing 
from a ‘compliance’ to a ‘value-creation’ tool. By casting a wider perspective on the operations and 
activities of a firm, BRA generates valuable knowledge on its current performance, as well as future 
risks and opportunities. Thus, through the development of BRA large accountancy firms have 
effectively redrawn the boundaries between auditing, risk management and management 
consultancy; as a result auditors are empowered to advice clients on a wide range of matters 
pertaining to their business whilst the economic potential of auditing services is maximised.   
Our second example broadens our focus from the technical (i.e. auditing) to the regulatory.  
Historically, professions have developed within the confines of the nation state and 
professionalization processes have often unfolded as part of broader state building projects (Burrage 
and Torstendahl, 1990). In this context, national regulations tend to control both who can deliver 
professional services (control over the production of producers) and how professional activities can 
be legally organized, produced, traded and consumed (control over the production by producers) 
(Abel, 1988). This implies that whilst global professional services firms have invested to develop one 
firm models of management (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013) based on globally integrated 
structures and seamless service delivery practices, their operations are often disrupted and 
fragmented by national regulatory requirements (Faulconbridge, 2008). Big Four accountancy firms 
have responded to such national impediments by actively trying to subvert local restrictions to their 
activities, developing in the process a global market for their services as well as helping to 
consolidate emerging transnational governance regimes which coexist with national regimes.  
At the heart of the Big Four’s attempts to change national regulations are WTO initiatives 
such as GATS article VI:4 and the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector; 
these being successfully used to challenge domestic regulations which restricted global accountancy 
firms’ activities in specific jurisdictions. Thus the autonomy of democratically elected institutions, 
such as national governments and professional associations, over traditionally domestic matter such 
as credentials, qualification regimes, ethical codes and standards of practice became subordinated 
to WTO mandated tests of necessity and proportionality, as well as to analyses of their compatibility 
with international standards. The inability of Greece in the 1990s to resist liberalization and to re-
regulate its own domestic accountancy profession, in face of opposition from large professional 
services firms and international organizations such as the OECD, represents a clear example of the 
effects of these measures (Caramanis, 2002). 
Our final example extends this analysis and indicates how large firms have been actively 
seeking to build a transnational training and qualification system around the new XYZ designation 
(Suddaby et al., 2007; Covaleski et al., 2003). This was intended as a transnational multidisciplinary 
qualification for global business professional; an elite MBA for accountants which crucially sought to 
deliver international consistency, visibility and recognition in professional qualification regimes so as 
to support more effectively the requirements of GPSFs and their clients. XYZ effectively operated as 
a market driven qualification whose legitimacy rested on its ability to add value to its holders, 
employers and users. The qualification effectively sanctioned a division between a business advisory 
elite which operated at a transnational level and the rest of the accountancy profession which 
continued to be embedded and constrained by national institutions, values and arrangements 
(Suddaby et al., 2007).  Although ultimately unsuccessful, the XYZ project provides a clear example of 
a transnational professional qualification which was explicitly designed to support the requirements 
and activities of GPSFs. In doing so it would have provided Big Four accountancy firms with an 
effective way to short-circuit national systems for the regulation of the production of producers and 
to recruit individual practitioners educated and socialized into the realities and norms of 
transnational professional work. This points out to the increasing role of GPSFs as sites of 
professional identity formation and regulation (Cooper and Robson, 2006) as firms deploy 
increasingly sophisticated HRM techniques, such as recruitment and selection, mentoring and 
corporate training programmes to mould the subjectivities of the professionals they employ in ways 
that best serve corporate priorities (Covaleski et al., 1995; Anderson Gough et al., 1998; Grey, 1998). 
As such, this example indicates how ‘the historical regulatory bargain between professional 
associations and nation states is being superseded by a new compact between conglomerate 
professional firms and transnational trade organizations’ (Suddaby et al., 2007: 334). In this context, 
GPSFs are hollowing out historical functions of the nation state and reframing these as part of new 
transnational governance regimes of which they are a key component.  
 
GPSFs in transnational governance ecologies 
The three examples from the accountancy profession discussed above all point to significant forms 
of institutional change driven by GPSFs as they disrupt established institutions and create new ones 
to support their organizational strategies and activities. Thus the traditional audit is transformed to 
cater for a broader range of business assurance functions and, in the process, helps to develop new 
lines of business. National regulatory systems are challenged and overhauled as part of attempts to 
legitimise the strategies and activities of GPSFs and to produce a global market for their services. 
Finally, new professional qualification systems and credentials are sought to support the needs of 
global practice, threatening to fragment established professional projects and institutionalizing 
divides between global professional elites and local practitioners.  
One important thing to notice here is how the professionalization projects pursued by GPSFs 
trigger broader processes of institutionalization. For instance, it was the attempts by accountancy 
firms to circumvent the effects of the restrictions imposed by Sabannes Oxley (2002) and by auditing 
departments to raise their profitability and prestige within their firms that led to the transformation 
of auditing practices. Similarly, attempts by large accountancy firms to use WTO regulations to 
expand their markets contributed to the hollowing out of the role of the nation-state and the 
consolidation of transnational governance regimes around the professions themselves. And, 
importantly, GPSFS were not isolated actors in the institutional transformations previously 
described. Rather, they acted as part of dense coalitions formed with key stakeholder in their 
broader field of practice. Thus, accountancy firms worked closely with academia to develop, diffuse 
and legitimize BRA, by funding research and teaching posts, providing case studies and other 
materials, co-authoring key texts (such as Bell et al., 1997 – which acts as the unofficial bible for 
BRA), and sponsoring as well as  participating in relevant academic conferences (such as KPMG’s 
Business Measurement Process Conference). Through these activities large firms have been able to 
shape the academic agenda and leverage this to help promote BRA methodologies; this being 
possible because of the desire of universities to reform their relationship with industry and their role 
in professional governance regimes.  
At the same time, because BRA calls on a broad range of business skills and knowledge in 
areas such a strategy, operations and risk management, which go beyond traditional auditing 
curricula and qualifications, accountancy firms have developed close working relations with the 
professional associations who set and police standards, frameworks and regulations in the 
accountancy field. In particular, the delivery of BRA required the development of new curricula, 
qualification pathways and professional credentials. Professional bodies, keen to reproduce their 
role and importance in a changing political economy, had a clear incentive to cooperate with Big 
Four firms to affect institutional change. For instance, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales (ICAEW) in its 1998 Green paper ‘Creating the Added Value Business Advisor’ 
promoted the development of new qualification pathways which explicitly targeted the 
development of the generalist business and management skills. Indeed, by the start of the new 
millennium, 25% of the ICAEW training syllabus was concerned with business risk and assurance 
(William, 2001 cited in Robson et al 2007). Importantly, such networks involve international 
organizations such as the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) of the 
International Federation of Accountants, who, as part of its Audit Risk Project, revised international 
auditing standards to reflect and in turn endorse the new BRA agenda in auditing practice. In 
particular, these revisions, in line with BRA methodology, led to the mainstreaming of risk 
assessment standards, which had traditionally been separate and peripheral issues, as core concerns 
within regulations on financial statement audits (IAASB 2002; 2003). Similarly, Big Four accountancy 
firms joined forces with international trade lobbies such as International Financial Services London 
(IFSL) and the US Coalition of Services Industries (USCSI), transnational professional networks such as 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), multinational clients such as UBS, BT and DHL, 
and international organizations such as the WTO, the OECD and the EU Commission to drive their 
deregulatory projects (Arnold, 2005).  
The intimate relationships between the institutional work of the Big Four and the allied 
projects of universities and regulators is supported by revolving door style arrangements through 
which Big Four firms funded named accountancy chairs at leading universities (such as Ira Thomson’s 
KPMG Professorship in Accountancy at the University of Illinois) and key staff moved between Big 
Four accountancy firms to key positions in professional associations and international regulatory 
bodies, and vice-a-versa.  
The impacts of such links is to place GPSFs such as the Big Four accountancy firms in de- and 
re-regulatory compacts with groups who share a similar institutional agenda including industry and 
lobby groups (such as the Liberalization of Trade in Services Committee), neoliberal states (such as 
the US and the UK) and transnational institutions (such as the WTO) which actively seek to expedite 
and extend measures associated with the construction of new transnational governance regimes. As 
such, the institutional agency of GPSFs cannot be disconnected from wider forms of transnational 
political economic settlement and complexly linked ecologies. GPSFs are, then, important 
stakeholders in the Washington Consensus and subscribe to its neoliberal vision of unfettered 
competition and open markets (crucially including professional services). This is perhaps 
unsurprising; after all, economic interest certainly ties GPSFs into a symbiotic relationship with the 
masterminds of the neoliberal agenda, as the new economic order delivers to them significant 
financial gains and opportunities whilst their services and expertise is essential to the smooth 
operation of transnational capitalism.  
 
The process and impacts of institutional work by GPSFs 
Reflecting the suggestion in the chapter by Seabrooke and Henriksen (this volume) that issues of 
scope, autonomy, resources, hiring, and knowledge are significant in analyses of the role of 
professionals in transnational regimes, the discussion here reveals three important dynamics in the 
transnational institutional work of GPSFs. 
Theorizing the scope of control. Exemplified by work associated with the institutionalization 
of BRA, we see GPSFs engaging in concerted efforts to expand the scope of their control over certain 
markets through a theorization process similar to that outlined by (Greenwood et al., 2002). This 
process identifies the problem at hand, and the solution GPSFs can provide to this problem. In the 
case of BRA the problem related to the reactive nature and the limited value-added of traditional 
auditing services, and the solution was provided by the integrated audit and risk assurance 
methodologies developed by Big Four firms. Through this theorizing firms were able to position 
themselves in a central position within the increasingly transnational field of business advisory 
services (Arnold, 2005; Barrett et al., 2005; Suddaby et al., 2007). Similar processes of theorization 
are present in other cases relating to the role of GPSFs in the development of transnational regimes 
– such as international bankruptcy and sustainable building design – yet to date the existing 
literature pays limited attention to the firms in question, something this chapter and the theoretical 
framing here developed can help to resolve.     
Defining scales of knowledge resources. As part of efforts to secure influence in 
transnational markets and regimes, GPSFs engage in sustained efforts to detach their claims of 
knowledge and expertise from national jurisdictions and reattach them to transnational regimes. 
This is associated with broader evolutions in the basis of the knowledge claims of the professions 
(Evetts, 1998, 2011), particularly towards a transnational arena in which the state is just but one 
actor in governance regimes (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2012). In the case of accountancy, this 
process is exemplified by the exploitation of the GATS regime to redraw national jurisdictions and 
challenge local regulations. This redefining of scales of knowledge in part means maintaining existing 
logics of professional practice – for instance the fiduciary logic associated with accountancy (Malsch 
and Gendron, 2013) – and exploiting the associated knowledge in claims about the centrality of the 
profession in transnational regimes.  
Transnational knowledges are, then, crucial resources for legitimacy claims. This often 
means invoking a process of rescaling onto the transnational level of the knowledges that 
professions have traditionally deployed at the national level to accomplish their professionalization 
projects. This process is further exemplified by the attempted XYZ qualification in accountancy; this 
new resource being designed to operate and be policed by transnational professional associations. 
Other examples of such resources include the protocols, deontological codes and principles of best 
(ethical) practice set out and monitored by transnational professional associations and networks 
such as the International Bar Association, International Union of Architects, the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board and the International Competition Network (on such bodies 
see Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2012; Hussain and Ventresca, 2010).    
Forming and exploiting ecologies of shared interest. A key aspect of the institutional work 
performed by GPSFs is the strategic effort to collaborate with and piggy-back on the agendas of 
other stakeholders in emerging transnational regimes. In the case of accountancy (as well as other 
GPSFs), such an ecology of shared interest is exemplified by relationships with international 
organizations like the WTO, the World Bank and IMF, as well as neo-liberal nation-states (such as the 
UK and US) and academic institutions. It is important to note that this is not an ecology that solely 
benefits the GPSF. At the same time they also serve the agendas of the collaborating organizations, 
with a mutual dependency developing. For instance, international organizations require the 
expertise of professional organizations to manage globalization processes and coordinate 
transnational governance regimes. Any illusions of professionals being separated from and 
impervious to commercial interest are, then, shattered in these emerging transnational ecologies 
where shared interest bind the GPSF to the neoliberal agenda of the Washington consensus 
(Morgan, 2006). This suggests that transnational regimes are the outcome of a strategic compact 
between parties that together seek to control issues that are central to the wider economic and 
social order.  
 
Conclusions 
We have in GPSFs a crucial locus of power and agency that is integral to and also exemplary of the 
construction of new transnational regimes that are transforming the system of the professions 
(Abbott, 1988) as well as the wider political-economy. Reflecting broader trajectories, GPSFs in 
various ways disconnect themselves from national professional projects and redefine their 
jurisdictions through three processes outlined in the previous section of the chapter. It thus seems 
crucial to more carefully locate GPSFs in debates about transnational governance and institutional 
change, transcending the established tendency to focus on professional firms and individual 
professionals in isolation, without consideration of the broader institutional context they inhabit and 
that help form.    
In closing we propose three agendas for future research that would enhance understanding 
of the role of GPSFs in transnational regimes. First, it seems important to further unpack the 
organizational strategies of the firms in question. By this we mean the ways that individual GPSFs 
seek to enact the scope, knowledge resource and ecology strategies outlined in this chapter. To date 
we know little about the efforts made by individual firms as part of their corporate strategies to 
enact transnational institutional projects. Second, the heterogeneity in the successes of GPSFs and 
the regimes they sanction in different countries needs closer scrutiny. As Djelic and Quack (2003) 
highlight, transnational regimes are additional layers of governance that coexist with national 
regimes. Yet, little effort has been made to bring back-in the national scale and consider how 
transnational compacts ‘come down to the ground’ and get operationalized in and through 
individual nation-states, with implications for the role of GPSFs within different jurisdictions and 
political-economic systems. The development of the international bankruptcy regime exemplifies 
this (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009), as it involved negotiations and compromises in each county 
deployed in. It would thus seem useful to provide more comparative work focussed on the efforts 
and outcomes of the activities of GPSFs in different national contexts. Third, better specifying the 
ecologies of shared interest that GPSFs are part of would be helpful in better revealing the new kinds 
of compacts and networks associated with transnational governance. For instance, we know little 
about the way GPSFs in the same sector (e.g. law) come together to form alliances, how GPSFs from 
different sectors compete or collaborate, or about how GPSFs manage to insert themselves into the 
agendas of the WTO and other supra-national organisations.  
There is, then, much to be done to further specify the role of GPSFs in transnational 
institutional processes including the creation and operation of those regimes that are so central to 
the functioning of contemporary economies and societies.  
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